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Since the beginning of the new millennium, and particularly
since the 2011 revolutionary uprisings, the Arab world has
experienced unprecedented levels of political violence and
disruption. However, against this bloody backdrop, a high-6.04.004
ed by Elsevier Ltd This is an open
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).tech reproductive revolution has quietly unfolded. Namely,
by the mid-2000s, the Arab world had developed one of the
most robust IVF sectors in the world (Inhorn and Patrizio,
2015; Jones et al., 2010). To be more specific, among the 48
countries performing the most assisted reproductive tech-
nology cycles per million inhabitants, eight Arab nations –access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
25Cosmopolitan in global Dubai?including Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Libya and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in that
order – could be counted (Adamson, 2009).
Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were the first Arab
countries to introduce IVF, each opening a clinic in 1986.
The first Egyptian IVF baby was born a year later, in 1987. By
the mid-1990s, the Arab world was in the midst of an IVF
‘boom period’ (Inhorn, 2003), with private IVF clinics opening
from Casablanca to Cairo. By 1995, IVF was available in all
of the major Arab cities, including places such as Beirut,
Damascus, Riyadh and Tunis.
As one of the seven Arab Gulf countries, located on the
Arabian Peninsula immediately to the east of Saudi Arabia,
the UAE (also known as the Emirates) was an early entrant
into this burgeoning field of IVF globalization (Inhorn, 2004).
The UAE opened its first IVF clinic in a government hospital
in 1991, only 5 years after Saudi Arabia introduced the
technology to the Arab Gulf. By 2005, the UAE hosted seven
IVF clinics, five of them private facilities. By 2012, that
number had doubled to 14, 12 of them privately owned.
Today, the Emirati IVF sector serves a global population
of expatriate foreign workers in the country, as well as
thousands of medical travellers seeking IVF services in Dubai
(Inhorn, 2015). IVF in the UAE is decidedly cosmopolitan,
catering to an international clientele who are attracted to
Dubai as a booming global city and an emerging medical
tourism hub. Yet this Emirati state-sponsored project of
‘medical cosmopolitanism’ (Inhorn, 2016) exists in tension
with another state-sponsored project called ‘emiratization’.
Emiratization is an attempt by the UAE government to
prioritize the needs of Emiratis, particularly through a
formal government mandate intended to increase the
participation of Emiratis in key positions in the UAE
private-sector workforce (Toledo, 2013). On a broader
societal level, however, emiratization is about putting
Emiratis first – prioritizing the needs of the muwatinun, or
‘nationals’, over foreigners. This is partly because Emiratis
now constitute a tiny fraction of the overall populace in their
own country – less than one million out of a total of nine
million, approximately eight million of whom are expatriate
foreign workers (Davidson, 2005, 2008; Kanna, 2011; Mahdavi,
2011, 2016; Vora, 2013).
In this article, the emiratization of the IVF sector will be
explored. Indeed, since the mid-2000s, the Emirati IVF
sector has undergone a series of profound transformations,
involving the indigenization-qua-emiratization of IVF services
in the country. Two main aspects of IVF emiratization will be
examined. The first involves the Emirati government’s brief
experiment with IVF public financing, which started off as a
generous IVF subsidization programme for all infertile couples,
but ended up solidifying preferential treatment for local
Emiratis. The second is the 2010 passage of UAE Federal Law
No. 11, which now stands as one of theworld’s most restrictive
pieces of assisted reproduction legislation. Passage of this law
resulted from a very fractious period of IVF history in the
Emirates, which resulted in a clinic war and led to legal
changes that have fundamentally altered the landscape of IVF
in the country.
In short, within the UAE’s 25-year-old IVF sector,
competing discourses of cosmopolitanism and emiratization
have played out, leading to an increasingly restrictive
and distinctive Emirati biopolitical and legal regime. Theparticular form of Emirati repronationalism – which is
characterized in this paper as the emiratization of IVF – is
at odds with the UAE’s distinct desire to serve as a medically
cosmopolitan technohub for the rest of the world. A beacon
of high-tech modernity on the one hand, and a bastion of
Emirati privilege on the other, the UAE is trying to have it
bothways– leading to significant paradoxes and complexities,
as well as new forms of reproductive privilege and
discrimination.Cosmopolitanism in the Emirates: a brief history
Cosmopolitanism – or the bringing together of diverse
constituencies from around the world (Skrbis et al., 2004) –
has a long and fabled history in the UAE. Formerly called the
‘Trucial States’, and made up of distinct, tribally-based
emirates located on the eastern shore of Saudi Arabia, the
UAE existed throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries as a
loose confederation of seven neighbouring provinces, including
Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah
and Umm al-Quwain. Dubai, in particular, was known as a
cosmopolitan trading hub, and a place of Arab, Persian and
Indian hybridity (Davidson, 2008). During its colonial period
as a British protectorate – which began in 1892 and ended in
1971 – the coastal town of Dubai was the most thriving,
trade-friendly, premiere free port of the lower Arab Gulf
(Davidson, 2008). As a result of this early openness, large
populations of South Asians and Iranians settled in Dubai, many
of them middle-class and wealthy merchants.
With the founding of the Emirati nation-state on 2
December 1971, the influx of foreigners into the country was
heightened by a period of hyper-development – particularly in
Dubai, but also in Abu Dhabi, the largest and most petro-rich
emirate, and the nation’s new capital. Early infrastructural
development projects in the UAE relied on the importation
of ‘experts’ (Mitchell, 2002), as well as thousands of day
labourers, mostly imported from South Asia (Ali, 2010). Since
then, the UAE has become known as one of the largest
migrant-receiving countries in the world (Mahdavi, 2011,
2016). Today, the nation of seven confederated emirates is
decidedly multinational and multicultural. Of the 9.44 million
people living in the country, according to official reports
(United Nations, 2014), only 13% are Emirati (and this may be
an overestimate, based on under-reporting of other national-
ities). The largest single group is South Asians (Kanna, 2011;
Vora, 2013) who, at 58% of the total population, are nearly
equally divided between Indians and Pakistanis (the former
slightly outnumbering the latter). Other Asians and Arabs from
many nations make up about 17% of the country’s population.
The remaining 8.5% are primarily Western expatriates
(‘expats’), as well as a growing number of migrants from
various parts of Africa (Barrett, 2010). The only continent not
well represented in the Emirates today is South America.
Dubai is the largest city in the Emirates, with a population
of nearly 2 million and more than 70 nationalities repre-
sented (Mahdavi, 2011). According to most commentators,
Dubai has emerged in the 21st century as the Middle East’s
only cosmopolitan metropolis – or, as anthropologist Ahmed
Kanna (2011) has described it, as a ‘fashionable global city.’
No longer reliant on the oil industry, Dubai’s economy has
significantly diversified, with main revenues coming from
26 MC Inhornthree interrelated sources: the global financial services
industry, a luxury real estate sector, and the international
tourist industry.
The tourist industry bears special mention here. Tourism is
the main engine of Dubai’s economy, thereby distinguishing
Dubai from the other Emirates. In 2012, Dubai was the eighth
most visited city in the world (thereby displacing Rome), and
top of the top ten ‘destination cities’ in the Middle East and
Africa, according to a Forbes survey (Forbes, 2012). As a tourist
destination, Dubai is famous for its iconic architecture –
including the sail-boat-shaped Burj al-Arab, which is the
world’s only seven-star hotel, and the sparkling, stalagmite-
shaped Burj Khalifa, which is now the tallest building in the
world. However, what attracts most tourists to Dubai is the
shopping. With more than 70 malls, Dubai has been called
the ‘shopping capital of the Middle East’, a veritable mecca of
consumption.
This well-developed tourist infrastructure is the basis of
the ‘lure of Dubai’ for medical travellers (Inhorn, 2015).
Medical travellers receive month-long visitors’ visas, extend-
able for up to 3 months, in order to undertake medical
treatments before exiting the country. Of all the cities in the
Middle East, Dubai is the only one to have cultivated a
reputation as a high-tech, global hub for medical treatment
and consumption. Indeed, Dubai is now considered one of
eight medical tourism destinations in Asia, and is home to the
Middle East’s only ‘medi-city’ (Horowitz and Rosensweig,
2007). Called Dubai Healthcare City (DHCC), this medi-city is
registered as one of 36 tax-exempt ‘free zones’ in the UAE,
and is said to contain more than 100 medical facilities and
more than 3000 healthcare professionals. Themission of DHCC
is to ‘compete for foreign patients’ (Ismail, 2012), as well as to
staunch the flow of wealthy Gulf Arabs, who for many years
have travelled abroad en masse for medical treatment in
places like Thailand (Whittaker, 2015).
The birth of Emirati IVF and the public financing
experiment
Before the UAE’s first IVF clinic opened in 1991, infertile
Emiratis were medical travellers, leaving the country,
primarily for London, to undertake IVF under UAE state
largesse. Although there are no official infertility rates
available for the UAE, given that nearly 10% of couples of
reproductive age throughout the world are infertile (Inhorn
and Patrizio, 2015), sending all infertile Emirati couples to
London was difficult for the UAE Ministry of Health (MOH) to
sustain financially over time. Thus, around 1990, the Dubai
Health Authority (DHA) decided to start its own IVF unit in a
local government hospital. Given the UAE’s former status as
a British protectorate, the DHA turned to the UK for
expertise in setting up the nation’s first IVF clinic. British-
trained gynaecologists began travelling to Dubai as ‘IVF
troubadours’ (Simpson, 2016), taking the art of assisted
conception with them from its birthplace in England
(Franklin, & Inhorn, 2016). In May 1991, the Dubai Gynae-
cology & Fertility Centre was opened with great fanfare in
Dubai’s main government hospital.
From its inception, Dubai’s government clinic was a
British import, practising assisted reproduction according to
British standards. As a ‘sister’ programme to a well-knownprivate IVF clinic in London, the Dubai IVF clinic was headed
by a senior British IVF physician, who travelled back and
forth until other staff could be hired and his contract ended.
Given the clinic’s location in Dubai, the new IVF centre
served a cosmopolitan clientele, including many British and
other European expatriate couples living in the Emirates,
and given its British standard of care, the UAE clinic offered a
full range of IVF services, including third-party reproductive
assistance. For example, infertile male patients could import
donor spermatozoa via international couriers from sperm
banks in London, Scandinavia or India. Infertile women –
including many professional women in Dubai of advanced
reproductive age – were allowed to bring their own ‘known
donors’ to the clinic, either family members or friends who
were willing to undergo egg harvesting. Although surrogacy was
rare, the Dubai government IVF clinic was otherwise the
equivalent of a London IVF centre. It served an international
clientele, and it enjoyed amonopoly in Dubai because the DHA,
in an early manifestation of emiratization, refused to grant
licences for non-Emirati IVF practitioners to open private clinics
in the Emirate.
With an effective monopoly on IVF in the UAE, the new
Dubai government IVF clinic was able to charge high prices
for its services, with a pricing structure equivalent to the
most exclusive private IVF clinics on London’s Harley Street.
Thus, for the first decade of IVF in the Emirates, infertile
couples were paying among the highest prices for IVF in the
world (Collins, 2002), at a going rate of between $5000 and
$6000 per IVF cycle. The stature of both Dubai and Abu Dhabi
as growing cosmopolitan hubs, with many Western expatriate
foreign workers, seemed to sustain these high fees, out-
stripping even petro-rich Saudi Arabia, where a single IVF cycle
could be obtained for less than $5000 (Collins, 2002).
Interestingly, Emiratis themselves were not exempt from
these high fees. Like the foreigners flocking to Dubai’s IVF
clinic, Emiratis were expected to pay the full rate. Further-
more, due to demand pressure on the nation’s sole clinic, both
Emirati and foreign couples began to experience long waiting
lists. Increasingly disgruntled, infertile Emirati couples put
pressure on the government, resulting in two decisive actions.
First, the UAE MOH allowed private IVF clinics to open outside
of Dubai, primarily in the neighbouring Emirates of Abu Dhabi
and Sharjah. Such private clinics – run by non-Emirati IVF
clinicians for both Emirati and foreign couples – were allowed
to operate as long as they were ‘sponsored’ by a kafil, or a
local Emirati ‘silent partner’, who would invest in a clinic’s
infrastructure, but would also reap at least 51% of the ongoing
profits. This so-called kafala, or sponsorship system, which is
standard practice for most business ventures in the UAE,
allowed several wealthy Emirati businessmen to become even
richer as benefactors – and beneficiaries – of the resulting
privatization of IVF in the Emirates.
In addition, the UAE MOH decided to relieve demand
pressure by opening a second government IVF clinic. Rather
than placing it in glitzy Dubai, the MOH underwrote clinic
construction in Al Ain, Abu Dhabi, a relatively remote desert
enclave, and home to the Emirates’ major public university,
the University of the United Arab Emirates (UAEU). The
IVF clinic was thus placed in UAEU’s government teaching
hospital, where IVF cycles would be offered free of charge to
both Emiratis and non-Emiratis alike.
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in IVF public financing. ‘Public financing’ is the term used by
health economists to describe the funding of assisted
reproduction, either through direct payment by the state
to local IVF clinics, or through state-funded health insurance
schemes that offer reimbursement for IVF to infertile couples
seeking care in these local clinics (Brigham et al., 2013). In the
Emirates, the new government IVF clinic in Al Ain adopted
the second system, offering reimbursable IVF cycles to both
Emirati and foreign couples through the state’s national
health insurance system, or daman.
However, the UAE government did not anticipate that
this would result in a flood of patients seeking treatment for
infertility. Foreign workers – ranging from the most elite
European expatriates to the poorest South Asian construction
workers – began clamouring to get to the new government IVF
clinic in Al Ain. Soon, long waiting lists formed with local
Emirati couples receiving scheduling priority in an early
manifestation of emiratization. In some cases, foreign couples
living in the country were left to wait months, even years, to
be granted an appointment.
Such foreign flooding of the sole ‘free’ government IVF clinic
quickly became unsustainable. By the mid-2000s, less than 5
years after the clinic opened, this brief experimental moment
of ‘IVF for all’ vis-a-vis Emirati state largesse had ended. The
state returned to reimbursing IVF cycles only for local Emiratis,
providing them with everything – from the costly IVF
medications to the expenses involved in the IVF procedures –
so long as they were willing to travel to Al Ain (as opposed to
Dubai or London) to access this state-subsidized care.
In retrospect, this brief experiment in Emirati public
financing of IVF was an early manifestation of emiratization.
Namely, UAE state subsidization of IVF is a citizenship right –
and expressly not a right for foreign workers, who are rarely
naturalized as Emirati citizens (Vora, 2013). Thus, state-
subsidized health insurance and access to free IVF applies only
to the ‘locals’, or Emirati nationals. Foreign residents can
access IVF at government clinics in the Emirates, but they
must pay prices that, as already noted, are among the highest
in the world.
In hindsight, the UAE government’s retrogressive measures
to publicly fund, and then de-fund, IVF services are not
surprising. Even though the UAE is a comparatively rich nation,
IVF is an expensive health technology, one that usually
requires costly repetition because of low success rates. Thus,
the UAEmade a strategic decision to fund IVF on a very limited
basis for its citizens. In this respect, it is not alone. Only a
handful of Arab countries provide public funding of IVF
services, and only on a partial basis. According to the 2010
International Federation of Fertility Societies (IFFS) surveil-
lance report (Jones et al., 2010), the UAE is the only nation in
the Arab world to report full government funding of IVF for all
Emirati citizens – but for Emirati citizens alone – in a distinct
repronational form of fiscal emiratization.The clinic war
At the same time that the UAE government was rolling back
its IVF public financing scheme, trouble was brewing in the
IVF sector itself. On 26 December 2005, an Emirati IVF
physician appeared as a guest on a local Arabic talk radioshow. In response to a caller’s question, the IVF physician
encouraged infertile Arab couples to attend only government
IVF clinics, because the private sector, the physician claimed,
was engaged in ‘foul play’. Soon thereafter, the government’s
English-language newspaper published an interview with the
same physician, who accused one of the UAE’s private IVF
clinics of engaging in the unscrupulous ‘freezing andmixing’ of
gametes and embryos. The newspaper claimed that the
aforementioned private clinic had been shut down by the
Abu Dhabi-based MOH. Infertile couples were thus encouraged
to seek IVF elsewhere, ideally in the government sector.
None of these allegations were true, but the impact on the
accused clinic – run a non-Emirati IVF physician with a
multinational staff – was immediate. Worried patients began
phoning to cancel their appointments, while others simply
wanted reassurance that the clinic was still open for business.
The clinic never shut its doors, but it was prevented from
accepting new patients until the MOH had come to assess the
situation. On 8 March 2006, a team of MOH personnel showed
up on the clinic’s doorstep. For an entire day, they
investigated the clinic, inspecting the ways in which gametes
and embryos were handled in the IVF laboratory, and scanning
patients’ medical files to look for signs of illicit gamete or
embryo donation practices. Because no evidence of ‘foul play’
could be detected, the government inspectors cleared the
private clinic of any wrongdoing, and eventually allowed the
clinic to take on new patients.
The multinational clinic staff were badly shaken by what
they perceived as a vicious and premeditated attack on their
professional ethics. One of the embryologists, a practicing
Sunni Muslim but from another Arab country, described the
chain of events as ‘the war that was waged against us’. This
2006 clinic war had multiple motivations. On the one hand,
public allegations made by one doctor against another are
suggestive of a lack of professional medical ethics in a country
where competition between clinics can become aggressive,
even malicious. Several IVF physicians, both Emirati and
non-Emirati, blamed the clinic war on a prevailing lack of
medical ethics and ‘fear-mongering’ in the country. As one of
them stated, ‘I think powerful people in the country are
misleading the authorities. "We don’t know what’s happening
in private clinics. We don’t know if they’re using donor sperm
and donor eggs". That sort of rubbish. People in positions who
are not medically qualified to know, but have a vested
interest, are spreading these kinds of rumours.’
These rumours, however, also involved deep-seated cultural
mores, emanating from the UAE’s Sunni Islamic religious
background. Indeed, the clinic war of 2006 involved an implicit
moral accusation that something haram– religiously forbidden
and unlawful – was taking place in private IVF clinics in the
country. Suggestions of ‘foul play’ and ‘illegal practice’ –
especially the ‘freezing and mixing’ of couples’ gametes
and embryos –were serious moral allegations. This is because
IVF is allowed within the Sunni Islamic tradition insofar as it
occurs only between a husband and wife, using their own
gametes. ‘Mixing’ of gametes and embryos – either intention-
ally or by mistake – has thus been a major moral anxiety ever
since the first IVF clinics opened in the Sunni-dominant
countries of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (Inhorn, 2003). An
explicit religious prohibition against third-party reproductive
assistance of any kind has been carefully spelled out in
numerous Sunni Muslim fatwas, or religious decrees, on IVF,
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Egypt’s renowned religious university, Al Azhar, in 1980. Since
then, this anti-donation religious stance has been upheld
repeatedly over the ensuing decades (Moosa, 2003), effec-
tively instantiating a powerful ban on third-party reproductive
assistance across the Sunni Islamic world, from Morocco to
Turkey (Gurtin, this issue). As a result, the vast majority of
Sunni Muslims –who account for approximately 80–90% of the
world’s 1.6 billion Muslims – will never consider undertaking
such third-party reproductive assistance, because they regard
these practices as haram, or deeply immoral (Inhorn, 2003,
2012).
Given the strength of this religious ban, the accusation
that frozen embryos and gametes were being ‘illegally
mixed’ at private IVF clinics in the UAE was a particularly
grave moral accusation. Furthermore, such mixing was alleg-
edly premeditated, occurring without the prior knowledge or
consent of patients. Children conceived through such ethical
malfeasance would be ‘biotechnological bastards’ of a sort –
offspring of unknown parentage, conceived through technolog-
ical misconduct. Intentional medical malpractice of this kind
would be considered unethical in any part of the world, not only
theUAE. This helps to explainwhy, during themidst of the clinic
war, patients from many countries called the accused clinic,
worrying that something ‘wrong’ had taken place in its IVF
laboratory.
In the end, this moral battle subsided once the Abu Dhabi-
based MOH cleared the accused clinic of any wrongdoing.
The involvement of the MOH was critical, not only in settling
the dispute, but in foreshadowing a new period of clinic
regulation in the country. In the aftermath of the clinic war,
the UAE slowly shifted from being the most ‘permissive’ to
the most ‘restrictive’ IVF regime in the Arab Gulf, and in the
Arab world as a whole. This process – which is characterized
here as the legal emiratization of IVF – has resulted in the
passage of one of the world’s strictest assisted reproduction
laws, called Federal Law No. 11.Legal emiratization of IVF
It is important to hark back for a moment to the early history of
IVF in the UAE, and the country’s particular neocolonial rela-
tionship with the UK. The first IVF clinic in the UAE was clearly a
British import, run by British-trained staff and offering third-
party reproductive assistance according to British standards.
However, these British clinical standards were unprecedented
in the Arab world. Wholesale importation of a British model of
IVF made the UAE the only Sunni Muslim country in the Arab
world to perform third-party donation of both eggs and
spermatozoa. This little-known fact about the UAE makes it a
true regional aberration. Furthermore, and quite ironically,
third-party reproductive assistance services were offered from
the very beginning at the UAE’s own government IVF clinic.
At the outset, no one seemed to question what was going
on, given that the mostly British staff members offered third-
party reproductive services to their non-Muslim patients.
This included Christian couples from Europe, the USA and
Australia, as well as many wealthy Hindu Indian couples, who
were familiar with third-party reproductive services in their
home country (Bharadwaj, 2003). However, by the end of the
1990s, increasing disquiet among the local Muslim populationbegan to take hold, concurrentwith a larger questioning of the
role of foreign experts in the country. Many Emiratis, as well as
other Arab patients coming to the clinic, began to question the
third-party gamete donation services on offer, as did some of
the clinic’s own Muslim staff members. By 1998, the DHA
effectively suspended third-party donation services in the
government clinic, insisting that the clinic’s bank of donor
gametes and embryos be destroyed.
This marked the end of Dubai’s 7-year ‘permissive’ period.
From that point on, IVF in the Emirates would be conducted
according to Sunni Islamic guidelines. These guidelines would
be enforced through a new phase of government regulation –
not only in Dubai’s main government IVF clinic, but also in the
private IVF sector that was now booming in the neighbouring
Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah.
By January 2007, the Abu Dhabi-based MOH, which was
charged with overseeing IVF clinic licensing and policy in the
UAE, had swung into action. A national MOH committee was
formed to develop federal guidelines on IVF in the Emirates.
The committee consisted of politicians from the UAE’s
Federal National Council (FNC); Muslim clerics from the
UAE’s main fatwa-granting institution; lawyers from the UAE
Court of Justice; two IVF physicians, one local and one from
another Arab country; and a representative from the DHA.
By July 2007, the committee had already drafted a federal
bill on IVF, which was being vociferously debated in the FNC,
one of the UAE’s main governing bodies.
Two key points of disagreement involved whether or not
to allow embryo freezing, and whether all IVF clinics must
include Muslim physicians on their staffs. In a heated debate
on the FNC floor, the UAE’s Minister of Health argued that
science and medicine ‘have no religion’ (Salama, 2007, p. 2).
As he put it, ‘IVF centres were set up and excelled in non-
Muslim countries. The UAE constitution does not discriminate
against any citizen on religious grounds’ (Salama, 2007, p. 2).
Similarly, the UAE’s Minister of State criticized the Muslim
physician imperative as ‘uncivilized and not keeping in line
with the UAE’s progress in all fields’ (Salama, 2007, p. 2).
This cosmopolitan viewpoint was not shared by most FNC
members,who nonetheless agreed that theMOH should be left
to deal with this matter during clinic licensing.
Over a 3-year period, from 2007 to 2009, the MOH worked
out its comprehensive IVF legislation. Drafted in 2008 and
amended through a cabinet resolution in 2009, Federal Law
No. 11, ’in connection with the fertilization centres in the
State’, was officially passed into law in early 2010, and was
signed by all seven standing emirs (rulers) of the confeder-
ation. Most importantly, Federal Law No. 11 is one of very
few assisted reproduction laws in the Middle East. Of the 22
Middle Eastern nations, only six countries (Algeria, Iran,
Israel, Tunisia, Turkey and the UAE) have enacted assisted
reproduction legislation (Jones et al., 2010). Three of these
countries (Iran, Israel and Turkey) are not Arab, and two of the
Arab countries (Algeria and Tunisia) are in North Africa. Thus,
the UAE is the sole Arab nation in the heart of the Middle East
to pass an assisted reproduction law. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi
Arabia – the first three Sunni Muslim countries to open IVF
clinics – have never passed assisted reproduction legislation,
relying instead on fatwa guidelines, which, although religiously
authoritative, are not legally binding (Inhorn, 2003). This is
because most Arab countries are decidedly less cosmopolitan
than the UAE; thus, the strength of fatwa guidelines alone is
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including the widely accepted Sunni Muslim ban on third-party
reproductive assistance (Inhorn, 2003, 2012).
Quite significantly then, the UAE’s Federal Law No. 11 is
not only singular, but can also be described as one of the
most comprehensive – indeed, most draconian – assisted
reproduction laws in the world. It describes how IVF clinics
are to be set up, licensed and staffed. It provides details of
how medical records are to be kept, lab data entered, and
pregnancies monitored to determine clinical success rates.
Prices are to be displayed clearly in both English and Arabic.
Waiting rooms and bathrooms are to be clearly marked and
gender segregated, without any pornography (which is illegal
in most Arab countries) to be placed in the men’s bathrooms
where semen collection takes place. Couples presenting to
clinics for treatment must bring valid passports or identityTable 1 The UAE’s assisted reproduction law: permissions and pro
Procedure Permitted:
halal
Prohibited:
haram
Anonymous third-party reproductive
assistance
X
Cryopreservation (freezing) of embryos X
Cryopreservation of gametes
(sperm and egg freezing)
X
Donation of embryos X
Donation of gametes X
Embryo banks X
Embryo couriers X
Embryo transfer X
Experimentation on the embryo X
Gender (sex) selection X
ICSI X
IUI X
IVF X
MFPR X
Polygynous gestational surrogacy X
Posthumous insemination X
PGD X
Reproductive cloning X
Same sex couples using ART X
Single women using ART X
Surrogacy via IVF X
Therapeutic stem cell cloning
(from human embryos)
X
ART = assisted reproduction; ICSI = intracytoplasmic sperm injection; IUI
PGD = preimplantation genetic diagnosis.
a The categories in this table are adapted from Jones et al. (2010). Thcards, a marriage licence and a photo of each spouse, and
must submit to both hepatitis and HIV testing.
Beyond these general requirements of clinic comportment,
Federal Law No. 11 is very specific about which assisted
reproduction practices are legally allowed (halal) and which
are illegal and prohibited (haram) (Table 1). Of 22 potential
assisted reproduction procedures, only seven, or approximately
one-third, are now allowed in the Emirates. Fifteen others
are prohibited, including, most notably, cryopreservation
(freezing) of embryos; gamete and embryo donation; surrogacy
(including by a co-wife within a polygynous union); or any kind
of assisted reproduction outside of heterosexual marriage.
These many prohibitions against gamete donation, embryo
donation and surrogacy, as well as the requirement ofmarriage
among infertile couples, are completely understandable within
the Emirati religious-moral environment described earlier.hibitions a.
Comments
Only the ‘required number of eggs’ are to be fertilized, but
any excess embryos must be left to expire ‘in a natural
manner’; this law is being challenged by physicians and
patients as ‘anti-woman’, and thus is being applied
differently across the Emirates.
With annual written consent of both husband and wife for a
maximum of 5 years.
Donation of both eggs and spermatozoa.
In keeping with the prohibition on cryopreservation of
embryos above; but being applied differently across the
Emirates.
No delivery of frozen embryos in or out of the country.
Maximum of three embryos in women ≤35; four embryos in
women N35.
Purportedly only for sex-linked genetic disorders.
Only using a married couple’s gametes (egg and sperm).
Same as above.
Same as above.
A form of selective foetal abortion not explicitly
mentioned in the ART law, but not being practised in most
of the UAE’s Emirates, where abortion is illegal.
With a wife in a polygynous marriage serving as a surrogate
for her co-wife.
For genetic screening and ‘family balancing’.
Part of a universal ban on this procedure.
Marriage of a heterosexual couple is required, with three
forms of identification (passport or ID, marriage licence,
photos of both spouses).
Same as above.
= intrauterine insemination; MFPR = multifetal pregnancy reduction;
e information comes directly from UAE Federal Law No. 11.
30 MC InhornHowever, what is highly unusual for the Muslim world is the
prohibition against embryo cryopreservation, with the con-
comitant ban on embryo banking. In no other part of the
Sunni Muslim world is it illegal to freeze embryos, assuming
that those embryos are legally created using the gametes of
a married couple. Cryopreservation of embryos is considered
a licit (halal) practice, and is clearly designated as such in
a variety of Sunni fatwas on assisted reproduction (Serour,
1996, 2008). Hence, the UAE law prohibiting embryo freezing
is uniquely restrictive, comparable only to the Vatican-
inspired ban on embryo cryopreservation in Italy (Inhorn
et al., 2010).
Given that embryo freezing is considered halal in the rest
of the Muslim world, the UAE’s legal prohibition on this
practice seems to have arisen from the specific concerns
that frozen embryos were being ‘mixed’, either intentionally
or unintentionally, without patients’ prior knowledge or
consent. Given the brouhaha that had occurred over embryo
mixing during the 2006 clinic war, outlawing embryo freezing
represented a particular instance of legal emiratization –
namely, the UAE’s own repronational attempt to prevent
third-party embryo and gamete ‘mixing’ from occurring on
Emirati soil. Although embryo freezing has been reinstated in
several Emirates following legal challenges and reconsidera-
tion by the UAE’s MOH, Federal Law No. 11’s prohibition on
embryo freezing still holds in Dubai – the Emirate where most
infertile foreign couples flock for IVF, only to discover the
legal ban on embryo cryopreservation and amultitude of other
ART services.Conclusion
In summary, IVF practices in the UAE have been increasingly
emiratized over the past 25 years in response to government
fiscal pressures and cultural sensibilities of the local Emirati
population. An IVF sector that began entirely as a British
import – transplanted directly into the ‘womb’ of the
UAE’s main government hospital – has gradually become
indigenized in response to perceived local needs. This
process of IVF emiratization can be understood as a variant
of the more formal government-mandated programme
of emiratization, which is designed to increase Emirati
representation in the private labour force in the country. In
the IVF sector, clinics have also come under increasing
government pressure to cater to the needs of Emiratis over
foreigners and to follow an Emirati assisted reproduction law
that is uniquely restrictive. This process of IVF emiratization
has sometimes been very painful, as illustrated in the
account of the 2006 clinic war in this article.
As a result of this emiratization process, IVF services that
were once openly practised and deeply desired by a globally
diverse group of infertile couples have gradually disappeared
over time. Emiratization – in its moral, medical, fiscal and
legal forms – has proven extremely difficult for the millions of
non-Muslim IVF patients living in, or travelling to, the Emirates
in the hope of accessing high-quality, medically cosmopolitan
IVF care. Once they arrive, however, they are often shocked
to discover a contemporary moral–legal environment in
which many potential assisted reproductive technologies are
entirely unavailable, as shown in Table 1. For many of these
reproductive travellers, this conservative biopolitical regimeis oddly out of sync with the Emirates’ progressive image as
a globally sophisticated, culturally cosmopolitan, medical
tourism hub.
In the end, then, it is fair to conclude that the twin goals
of Emirati statecraft – namely, a self-conscious medical
cosmopolitanism coupled with a government-mandated
emiratization – are existing at cross-purposes in the second
decade of the new millennium. Emiratization has meant the
increasing curtailment of cosmopolitan conceptions in global
Dubai. How these opposing forces will play out in the future
remains to be seen. Meanwhile, emiratization appears to
be consolidating the privileges of an already privileged
citizen-minority, leading to reproductive discrimination and
disenchantment among infertile ‘outsiders’ living in, or
travelling to, this global reprohub.Acknowledgements
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